Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 4

October 2002

An Experimental Approach to the Study of Social Norms: The
Allocation of Intellectual Property Rights in the Workplace
Yuval Feldman
University of California, Berkeley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Yuval Feldman, An Experimental Approach to the Study of Social Norms: The Allocation of Intellectual
Property Rights in the Workplace, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59 (2002).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

An Experimental Approach
to the Study ofTO
SocialTHE
Norms:STUDY
The Alloca
ANFeldman:
EXPERIMENTAL
APPROACH
OF SOCIAL NORMS: THE ALLOCATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE
WORKPLACE

Yuval Feldman*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ........................................... 62

II.

PURPOSES OF THE ARTICLE ................................. 65

III.

STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE ................................ 66

IV.

THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND ................
A. THIE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPER'
DISTRIBLION IN THE EMPLOYMENTCONTEXT ..............
B. OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN EMPLOYEE INVENTION ...........
C. TRADE SECRETS .......................................

66

66
67
69

1. Research.Question 1: Overal, Which Legal Doctrineis
More Like# to Be Obeyed by Silicon Valley Employees? ......... 73
a. The 'New" Norms Scholarsho ......................... 73
2. Research.Quertion 2: Relationshos Between Perceived
Norm, PereivedFairness, Wil'ngness to Punish and
Intention to Oby the Law ................................ 76
3. ResearchQuestion 3: Does Uncerainqy about the Law
Moderate a Norm's Effect on People'sSef-reported
Intention to Obg the Law? ............................... 79

* PhD Candidate, Jurisprudence and Social Policy, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of
California, Berkeley. I want to thank Professor Robert D. Cooter, Professor RobertJ. MacCoun and
Professor Mark Lemely for their help. I would also like to thank Ms. Martha Kelley and Ms. Gracie
W. Waldrup for editing the manuscript. An earlier version of this Article was submitted for a
seminar in Organizational Behavior, Hass School of Business, UC Berkeley, Spring 2001.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

1

60

Journal of IntellectualJ.Property
Law,
Vol. 10,
INTELL
PROP.
L Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4 [Vol. 10:59

4. Research Question 4: Comparingthe Normative Perceptions of
IP Requirements for State Laws vs. Employment Contracts.........
a. Compliance to Which Source ofLaw is More Sensitive to the
Effect ofNorms, Employment Contractsor State Laws? ........

80

81

V.

M ETHOD ................................................

82

VI.

STUDY D ESIGN ...........................................
A. PARTICIPANTS ..........................................
B. PROCEDURE ...........................................
C. VARIABLES, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, SOCIAL NORMS ........

83
83
84
85

VII.

1. SocialNorms of High Compliance ..........................
2. Social Norms of Low Compliance ...........................

85
85

3. Source ofLaw (Contract/Statute)and Legal Doctrine
(Trade-secrets/Assignmentof Copyrights) .....................
4. Trade Secrets .........................................
5. Loyalty to the Company ..................................
6. Position Characteristics ..................................
7. ContractingProcess .....................................
8. Social Comparison .....................................
9. LgalAmb guifi .......................................

85
85
85
86
86
86
86

RESULTS .................................................

86

A.
B.
C.
D.

88
88
89

TRADE SECRETS VS. COPYRIGHT ALLOCATIONS ...............
LEGAL AMBIGUITY ......................................
THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS ..................................
OBEDIENCE TO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS VS.
OBEDIENCE TO STATE LAWS ..............................
E. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ..................................
F. EFFECT OF NORMS ON OBEDIENCE TO STATE LAWS VS.
EFFECT OF NORMS ON OBEDIENCE TO EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS ............................................

89
90

90

VIII. D ISCUSSION ..............................................
A. COPYRIGHTS VS. TRADE SECRETS ..........................
B. LEGAL AMBIGUITY ......................................
C. CONTRACTS VS. REGULATIONS ............................

91
91
93
94

IX.

CONCLUSION .............................................

96

X.

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE ..............................

97

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss1/4

2

Feldman: An Experimental
Approach
to the Study
of Social Norms: The Alloca61
NORMS
2002]
STUDY
OF SOCLIL
XI.

APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGICALLIMITATIONS ...............

104

X II.

TABLES .................................................

106

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

3

Journal of IntellectualJ.Property
Law,
Vol. 10,
INTELL
PROP.
L Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4 (Vol. 10:59
I. INTRODUCTION

Recently social norms have been the object of increasing attention from legal
scholars. While initially only scholars from the law and society movement were
involved in this line of research,' over the last ten years the leading role in this
area has moved to law and economics scholars.' The interest of law and
economics in social norms definitely represents a positive development, and,
thanks to the central role of law and economics in U.S. law schools, it seems to
have increased the amount of attention paid to social norms literature in legal
scholarship generally.
Nonetheless, it seems that while more and more models and theories have
been suggested, not much has been done to improve our extant data relating to
the interaction of law and norms. In fact, the more psychologically-oriented legal
scholars who discuss these trends in law and economics argue either that these
models are not backed by current research3 or, even less promising, could not be
backed by future research, because they are simply not falsifiable.4
Moreover, much of the social norms scholarship focuses on abstract and
hypothetical scenarios, such as smoking in airports' and cleaning after one's dog.6
While naturally the focus on abstract situations allows for a clearer discussion of
normative forces, there still seems to be an effort afoot to examine the particular
relevancy of norms to legal doctrines. Most of the recent papers on social norms
that examine their potential contribution to legal enforcement do not seem to
differentiate between their effects on specific behaviors. Thus, there is no
recognition of the possibility that the relevancy of norms to legal behavior will
vary across different doctrines due to the unique social and situational
circumstances in which people face legal doctrines.'
What seems to be fundamentally missing in the current norms scholarship in
law and economics is a respect for the standing knowledge gathered by other

'Amitai Etzioni, SodalNorms: IntemakZation, Persuaion,andHisto, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 157
(2000).
2 See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, The Marketfor SodalNorms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2001).
3
4

See, e.g. Jeffrey j. Rachlinksi, The Limits of SocialNorms, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1537 (2000).
See Robert E. Scott, The Limits of BehavioralTheories of Law and SodalNorms, 86 VA. L REV.

1603 (2000).
s Richard H. McAdams, A FocalPointTheoy of Exprrssive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000).
6 Scott, supra note 4.
An important exception for the abstract approach of law and social norms research can be
found in a symposium that explored the specific implications of the social norms theory for
corporate law. See Symposium, Norms & Corp. Law, 149 U. PA. L REv. 1607 (2001). For an
introduction, seegeneraly Michael L. Wachter & Edward B. Rock, Norms & Corp.Law: Introduection,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001).
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disciplines on the subject.8 Without limiting the importance of the new
perspective on social norms offered by economists and the unique ability of
economics to explore social equilibriums, it is my position that they should not
ignore this multi-disciplinary store of knowledge.' In fact, it seems that some of
the issues raised in the above-mentioned critiques relating to the scientific validity
of the law and economics of social norms could have been resolved if economists
had been more willing to incorporate knowledge from other disciplines."
In light of this evaluation of the current status of the law and economics of
social norms, I have aimed in this Article to take an experimental approach" to
the study of social norms in a specific context and in regard to particular
doctrines. Naturally, I am not attempting to solve all of the above-mentioned
limitations in one study. Rather, my purpose is to demonstrate the great potential
for the law and social norms literature that lies in such an approach.
One of the arenas in which the social norms literature should have had a
greater influence is that of employment relations.' 2 Much has been written on the
topic of organizational behavior and the interaction between norms and rules in
the workplace. One of the main themes mentioned in this context relates to the
fact that formal legal rules are limited in their ability to practically regulate the
behavior of employees and employers. Nonetheless, the recent law and economic
scholarship of social norms has yet to realize the uniquely important
circumstances that exist in the workplace. I have chosen to focus specifically on
the employees' behavior when moving from one company to another, because it
deals with one of the most fascinating interactions between the legal rules and the
social forces. This is a stage in which loyalty to the new employer seems to be,
in many cases, at odds with loyalty to the previous employer. Among the
behaviors that are ofinterest to the legal policymaker here is the use of intellectual
property (IP) that is legally owned by the previous employer.13 From the
perspective of social norms, the use of IP by departing employees is primarily
important for two reasons.
Robert D. Cooter, Law and Unifed Sodal Theog, 22J. L. & Soc. 50 (1995).
For an elaboration on the relationship between the law and economics of social norms and
the psychological theories of social norm see Yuval Feldman & Robert J. MacCoun, Old Winefor the
'New Norms"Bonks: The SoaalPychologyofSodalNorm andLgalComphance,SUPREME COURT ECON.
S

REV. (forthcoming Winter 2003) (on file with author).
10 See,

e.g.,
Austin D. Sarat, Law and SodalNorms, 38 CHOICE 402 (2000).

"Cf Eizabeth Hoffman &MatthewL Spitzer, Enitement, Rightr, andFairness:An Expeimental
Examination of Sueats' Conepts of DitributiveJustie, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985).
12 See, e.g., Michael Segalla et al.,
CulturalInteence on Emplyee Termination Deasions: FiringThe
Gooai Average or The Old?, 19 EUR. MGMT.J. 58 (2001).

" For an excellent collection of papers that discuss some of the most important policy topics
in this area, see NEw RELATIONSHIP:

HUMAN CAPITAL IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION

(Margaret M. Blair & Thomas A. Kochan eds., 2000).
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First, formal legal enforcement is very limited in this specific stage. Lawsuits
against former employees are expensive and fairly uncommon. Furthermore,
when an employee moves to another company, the first employer's ability to
detect a violation is limited; this fact increases the transaction costs of formal
control use 4 and, hence, increases the importance of non-formal controls."
Second, social norms seem to be especially important in this context because
the legal rules that regulate intellectual property in the workplace cannot be very
informative without further clarifications from norms. 6 As I will discuss shortly,
social norms are expected to have greater effect on behavior when people are less
certain about what to do.
Intellectual property generally focuses on utilitarian thinking. 7 However, in
the context of intellectual property in the workplace, more attention is given to
non-utilitarian aspects, and especially to justice. The non-utilitarian foundations
of information sharing are far from clear.' While some scholars refer to those
employees who use previous employers' knowledge as "innovative
entrepreneurs," others see them as simple thieves and as immoral employees."O
It is clear, then, that there are sufficient structural arguments for the
importance of norms to the study of intellectual property. Apart from these,
though, there is another key factor that makes a case study of the examination of
IP in the workplace an especially interesting endeavor for a behavioral approach
to the study of social norms. This factor is the reported culture of information
sharing in Silicon Valley.
The norm of intellectual property in Silicon Valley was explored in Saxenian's
book, RegionalAdvantage.' The low status, both legal and social, conferred to

"4See Ronald J. Gilson, The .e2gd1nfrastrtur of High Technoloy IndestrialDirit:Siicon Vay,
Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L REV. 575 (1999).
" It should be mentioned, though, that, in general, formal controls in the workplace are treated
as limited. For econometric evidence concerning the limits of formal decisions of the NLRB
compared with the influences of collective bargaining and work practices, see Robert J. Flanagan,
Compkane andEnforrentDedsions Under the NationalLaborRelationsAt, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 257 (1989).
6 See Edmund W. Kitch, The E anwon of Trade Searg Protection andthe Mobilit of Manapment
Emfployees: A Nw Problemfor the Law, 47 S.C. L REV. 659 (1996).
' see~gerah5yPeter Menel, InteleualPrprt:
GeneralThe nets, ENCYCLOPEDIAL &EcoN. VOL
II (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). Menell argues that "Not surprisingly, the
principal philosophical theory applied to the protection of utilitarian works-that is technological
inventions-has been utilitarianism." Id at 130. See also Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An
Introductionto the Law and Economics of IntellectualPropery, 5 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 3.
'8 See Mcneil, stpra note 17, at 156-59 (discussing several non-utilitarian perspectives of

intellectual property, including- libertarian, personhood, labor theory, distributive justice and
democratic).
" James Pooley, a prominent trade secret lawyer in Silicon Valley, has described his job as
consisting of defending entrepreneurs and suing thieves.
2 ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON
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potential limitations on the transfer of knowledge by employees is the main cause,
according to this book, of the success of Silicon Valley. While this book does a
very good job of identifying the behavioral patterns of employees in Silicon
Valley, it does not speak to the attitudes of employees there toward trade secret
law when faced with the fact that sharing information is a violation of the law.
In sum, the extremely limited involvement of courts,2 the conflicting
economic rationales in regard to trade secrets,' and the differences among
various regions in the United States with respect to competition' all combine to
make the interaction of formal laws and social norms in the context of IP
distribution in the workplace a promising case study.
II. PURPOSES OF THE ARTICLE

In the previous section, I have examined some of the limitations of the current
social norms scholarship in the fields of law and economics. I have advocated for
an exploration of the effects of social norms in a real-life setting; moreover, I have
promoted the idea that the social norms models should be explored separately
and on different grounds, and should take into account the legal complexities.
Furthermore, I have argued that employment relationships in general and IP
distribution in the workplace in particular provide excellent arenas for case studies
of social norms.
To meet the challenges stated in the introduction, I have taken an
experimental approach24 to the study of social norms among high-tech employees
in Silicon Valley in the context of intellectual property. Such an approach will

VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994).
21This is part of the described norm in the Valley. See Hyde, infra note 59.
Thus, while most studies that involved rational choice, social control, and extra legal sanctions
focused on phenomena such as theft or drunk driving (se, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond
Paternoster, Endurimg InsidaDifferences andRationalChoice Teories of Crine,27 L & SOc'Y Rxv. 467
(1993)), the context of trade secrets is far more interesting because of the arguable social benefits
that result from such violations of the law.
' In most states in the United States, non-compete covenants are enforceable. California and
seven other states constrain this option. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this point.
4 I will explain the particulars of the study in the methodology section of this Article. However,
for the purposes of the reader who is not familiar with social science methods, I would add at this
point that an experimental approach differs from other types of research in its random assignment
of study participants to different treatment conditions. In short, this randomization allows the
researcher to test, in a relatively clear way, the causal effect between the manipulated factors and the
measured behavior. In this particular example, I have controlled the source of the legal requirement
(state law or employment contract). In addition, I have controlled for the normative status of the
legal compliance to intellectual property regulations (high or low) compliance.
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allow me to test the causal effect of norms on laws in a controlled way.
Moreover, it will allow me to compare the effect of norms in the contexts of
differing legal sources (employment contracts vs. state law) and doctrines
(allocation of employee invention copyrights and divulging of trade secrets). In
addition, in the context of employment relationships, I will examine the
participants' attitudes toward their employers as well as the legal rules that regulate
those employment relationships.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE ARTICLE

This Article is divided into four parts. In the first part, I review and discuss the
doctrinal and theoretical background for my research. I organize this discussion
around three main themes:
1. A comparison of trade secrets regulation to ownership-rights
allocations,' in the workplace in general and in Silicon Valley in
particular.
2. The inter-relationship between employees' attitudes and
perceived social norms with regard to legal compliance.
3. A comparison from a social norms perspective of legal
compliance to IP requirements in state laws and in employment
contracts.
In the second part, I explain the methodological approach that I take in this
study and the factors that I have collected data on. In the third part, I present and
analyze the empirical results of the study. Finally, in the concluding part of the
Article, I discuss the theoretical and policy-related implications of my study for
social norms scholarship as well as for the formal and informal enforcement of
intellectual property distribution in the workplace.
IV. THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A. THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTELLECIJALPROPERTY DISTRIBLTIION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT

Put simply, employees produce most of the knowledge in the world, but most
of this knowledge will stay with their employers. There are three main types of

s While assignment of ownership rights could mean both copyrights and rights for patents, I
have focused on copyrights because this study was done in the context of the software industry. I
am mainly interested in a comparison between ownership rights and trade secrets.
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intellectual property rights that are relevant in the employment context: trade
secrets, copyrights and patents. In practice, though, these doctrines sometimes
overlap. For example, in some cases, even if the employee owns the right to the
invention, he will not be able to use it because trade secrets of the employer are
embedded in the product. Nonetheless, with regard to employee inventions,
there is a major theoretical difference between trade secrets and allocation of

ownership rights. In the academic literature, human capital distribution between
employer and employee is organized under two main categories: trade secrets and
ownership rights assignment (copyrights and patents). 6
B. OWNERSHIP RIGHTS IN EMPLOYEE INVENTION

The overall picture of the legal environment regarding employee invention is
usually described as being more in favor of the employer.' In most cases, courts
enforce pre-assignment contracts.' One of the rare exceptions to this tendency
occurs when the employee assigns rights to an invention that he or she developed
independent of company resources."
Two statutes in California are of interest with regard to the legal status of
employee inventions. The first discusses the freedom of employers and employees
3
to bargain over their property rights to inventions: 0
(a) Any provision in an employment agreement which provides
that an employee shall assign, or offer to assign, any of his or her
rights in an invention to his or her employer shall not apply to an
invention that the employee developed entirely on his or her own
time without using the employer's equipment, supplies, facilities, or
trade secret information except for those inventions that either:
(1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to practice of
the invention to the employer's business, or actual or demonstrably
anticipated research or development of the employer; or
(2) Result from any work performed by the employee for the
employer.

There are some differences between the allocation of patents and the allocation of trade
secrets in the work place that are less relevant to the purposes of this study.
" For an historical review of this development, see Catherine L Fisk, Removing the FeldofInterest'
fron the Fi ofGexius". Law andths Employs Inentor,1830-1930,65 U. CHI. L REV. 1127 (1998).
2 See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownershi Rights of Emlyee Inventions: The Rok of Prwnvention
Assgnment Agrements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT. INTELL PROP. LJ. 163, 172-73 (1994).
29 See Ronald B. Coolley, Recent Changes in Employe OwnershipLaws: Employe May Not Own Their

Inventions and ConfidenialInformation, 41 BuS. LAw. 57, 59 (1985).
30 CAL. LAB CODE S 2870 (West 2002).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4

J. INTELL PROP.L[

[Vol. 10:59

(b) To the extent a provision in an employment agreement
purports to require an employee to assign an invention otherwise
excluded from being required to be assigned under subdivision (a),
the provision is against the public policy of this state and is
unenforceable.
Thus, the law in California, as well as in seven other states, allows employers
to pre-assign any invention that is related to the employer's line of business or
used by its equipment.
The second statute deals with the state-based allocation of property rights:
"[e]verything which an employee acquires by virtue ofhis employment, except the
compensation, which is due to him from his employer, belongs to the employer,
whether acquired lawfully or unlawfully, or during or after the expiration of the
term of his employment." 3'
The literature on this topic,32 as with many similar bodies of literature dealing
with the allocation of property rights, considers two major issues-fairness and
efficiency. In the context of fairness (or equity), many argue against the injustice
of the current distribution in which employees get almost nothing3 for their
creativity. 3' These scholars reiterate the classical view that employees are the
"underdog" in the employment context and that creative employees should not
be forced to assign the rights to their invention to their employer.3" Nevertheless,
even in the context of fairness, some argue that, given that employers internalize
the risks of employing many engineers that invent nothing, it is fair that they
should at least get rewarded for their better choices.3
In the context of efficiency, the picture is no simpler. Indeed, there are those
who focus on offering an incentive to the innovative employee by way of a bigger

31 CAL. LAB. CODE S

2860 (West 2002).

32 A thorough review of work for hire inthe high-tech industry can be found in Matthew R.

Harris, Note, Copyrght, Comptter Software, and Work Madefor Hire, 89 MICH. L REV. 661 (1990). See
alsoJon L Roberts, Work Madefor He The Fiction,the Rsalify andthe Impact upon Sofiware Dewlopmet,
1 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 97 (1988) (examining the application of the work for hire doctrine in the
software development context).
" Obviously, it should be mentioned that the common practice in most companies is that
inventors usually get bonuses, stock options, and higher value in the labor market.
' See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Imventori of the Wora Unite! A CallforColkctiveAction by FployeeInventors,
37 SANTA CLARA L REv. 673 (1997) (discussing the disincentives to innovate confronting the typical
employee-inventor).
35See Mark B. Baker & AndreJ. Brunel, Rttrudutingthe Juli'alEvaluationof Employed Inventors'
Rights, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 399 (1991) (complaining that the law does not do enough to protect
employees).
' See Robert P. Merges, The Law andEconomis of Employe Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L & TECH. 1
(1999).
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share of the rights.' However, it seems that the mainstream law and economics
scholars who discuss the allocation of rights in employee invention tend to
support the view that all rights of employee inventions" should stay with the
company due to transaction costs, risk allocations and team production
arguments.39 The same is true with regard to the policy of courts in the United
States in general and in California in particular. Generally, judges tend to allocate
employees inventions to the employer.' Such a legal policy might not intuitively
seem fit,41 given the common wisdom regarding the cultural value in the United
States whereby an individual should own her creation." The policy might be even
more surprising when compared to California courts' low enforcement of trade
secrets, which, at least by definition, are not the sole creation of the employee.
C. TRADE SECRETS

While copyright assignments are a strict matter of who owns what, the area of
trade secrets is much less clear.43 To begin with, there is no legal consensus as to

37

See, e.g.,Jay Dratler Jr., Note, InerntwsforPeopk: The Forgotten Purpose of the Patent System, 16

HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 129 (1979); Henrik D. Parker, Note, Reformfor Rightr ofEmploytdInventors, 57 S.
CAL. L. REV. 603 (1984) (discussing the problem of incentives for inventors and the reduction in

innovation in the United States).
38 Especially with regard to firm-related inventions.
'9 A very important paper in this context is Michael A. Heller, The Tragey of the Anticommonw:
Provpfeq in the TransitionfivmMarx to Markets, 111 HARV. L REV. 622 (1998). See ato Merges, ispra
note 36 (reviewing the management literature of innovation, and concluding that, in a world of team
production, the law should assign all property rights to the employer).
o See William P. Hovel, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rihts to His Employees Inyention, 58
NOTRE DAME L REv. 863, 867 (1983).
41 As I will discuss in the next section, the most intuitive view about justifying intellectual
property is related to the idea that if I have not created it, it was never there in the first place, and
therefore I should own it. See Edwin C. Hettinger,JwatibingInlledualPropetj, 18 PHIL & PUB. AFF.
31,39 (1989):
Having a moral right to the fruits of one's labor might also mean having a right

to possess and personally use what one develops. This version of the labor
theory has some force. On this interpretation, creating something through labor

gives the laborer a prima facie right to possess and personally use it for her own
benefit.
Nonetheless, as Hettinger himself admits on page forty-four, the distributive justice perspective is
clear it does not mean that the creator should own the product, it means that she instead might
enjoy other benefits for having produced it. Utilizing this rationale to an employment context might

suggest that getting a bonus or partial ownership would satisfy the distributive justice principle.
42 See Jane K. Giacobbe-Miller & Daniel J.A. Miller, A Comparison of U.S. and Russian Py
Allocation Dedo and DiitribufiveJastireJudgmnt,Best Papers Proceedings 1995. AcAD. MGMT. J.
177.
' The definition of trade secrets in California can be found in CAL. CIrv. CODE S 3426.1 (2001):
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whether a trade secret is a property right or a legal obligation of confidentiality."
This very conceptual debate emerged in the U.S. courts.4"
While some courts have said that "the starting point for the present matter is
not property or due process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential
relationswith the plaintiffs . . .,"' other courts have said that "[t]he starting point
in every case of this sort is not whetherthere was a confidentialrelationship,
but whether,
' 47
in fact, there was a trade secret to be misappropriated.
Thus, according to the first line of reasoning, the concept of trade secrets
misappropriation is heavily related to the nature of the employment relationships.
The main concern of trade secrets laws lies, therefore, in the improvement of legal
ethics and trust in the employment context." According to the second line of
reasoning, trade secrets are more similar to other intellectual property rights in the
sense that they require one to focus first on the property value of the secret. They
thus share a similar rationale with other IP laws based on a utilitarian ideal,
encouraging innovation.
In terms of public policy, the trade secrets literature has a very different
perspective regarding the employee-employer relationship. While historically this
doctrine has clearly favored employers,4 9 public policy considerations regarding
the freedom of occupation have made the enforcement of trade secrets, especially
in California, much harder. Courts in California argue repeatedly ° that the main

(d)"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(1)Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use; and
(2)Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
"See Miguel Deutch, The Pmr" Concept of Trade Secrets in Anglo-Amencan Law: An Ongoing
Debate, 31 U. RICH. L REv. 313 (1997) (reviewing the various factors that might lead us to consider
whether a trade secret is in fact an in rem right, or only an in personam right, such as a contractual
right).
45SeeJames Pooley, Defting Trade Secrets (1997) (unpublished manuscript-copy with the author)
(generally arguing that trade secrets are extremely hard to define in court litigation). The following
two cases were quoted by him.
"E.I. DuPont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) (emphasis
added).
4 Van Products Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 213 A.2d 769, 78) (1965)
(emphasis
added).
4 Melvin F. Jager, TRADE SECRETS LAW, § 1.01 (1985).
"Catherine L.Fisk, Working Kfowkde: Trade Secrets, Restnctiw Covenants in Eployment, and the
Rise of CorporateIntelkctsalPropmy, 1800-1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001).
50 See, e.g.,
Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 287 (1962) (stating that the
employee "was privileged to disclose and use the formulas which he had developed-they being a
part of the technical knowledge and skill that he had acquired...").
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public policy consideration relates to the employee's mobility. The following
quote is typical: "[Tihe Second Circuit has observed that courts in trade secret
cases 'often balance an employer's right to proprietary information against an
employee's right to use his or her knowledge, training, and experience to gain a
livelihood.' ,,
.An even stronger statement in favor of employee mobility can be seen in the
following quote: "Mhe decision to focus on relationships and not to treat trade
secrets as 'property' apparently reflects a policy choice by California authorities
in which interests in promoting freer use of new ideas was elevated at least to
over interests in rewarding holders of economically significant
some extent
52
secrets."
Moreover, trade secrets enforcement is best achieved via the non-compete
covenant, since the employee lacks the opportunity and incentive to share her
previous employer's trade secrets. s3 However, in California these contracts are
not enforceable, 4 a reality that makes the enforcement of trade secrets harder.
In this case, the court can no longer rely on the contract and must find out
whether there was a trade secret and whether there was a misappropriation-both
slippery terms. For this reason, Gilson 55 argues that it is very hard for employers
to prevent employees from moving to their competitors.
Even more important than the formal legal regime is the informal reality of
trade secrets in the Silicon Valley. Saxenian 6 argues that, as opposed to the
classical belief of economists regarding the 'boundaries of the firms' and the
'tragedy of the commons,' the main cause of Silicon Valley's success is the
spillover of knowledge that occurs between firms in the Valley. Because
employees transferred negative information 7 and new ideas, the area as a whole
has succeeded. In follow-up studies conducted by Gilson," who focuses on non-

5.01 (1994) (quoting Vermont
Microsystems, Inc. v. Autodesk, Inc., 88 F.3d 142, 150,39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421 (2d Cit. 1996)).
5" Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 634, 652, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (N.D
Cal. 1993).
53 See Kitch, supra note 16, at 667.
54 CA. Bus. &PROF. CODE § 16600 (Deering 1997) ('Except as provided in this chapter, every
contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind is to that extent void.').
55 Gilson, supra note 14.
-6 SAXENIAN, supra note 20.
s'Negative information cannot be patented but it captures most of the knowledge aggregated
by a firm, and many of the problems courts face in enforcing trade secrets center around the
difficulties in preventing the ex-ernployee from using negative information he was exposed to during
his employment period.
s8See Gilson, supra note 14.
51Roger M. Milgrim,

1 MILGRIM

ON TRADE SECRETS
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compete covenants, and Hyde, 9 who focuses on trade-secrets laws, the laws and
especially the norms that eliminate the law are analyzed as moving toward the
interests of the employees.' Stone 1 argues in a tone similar to Hyde that, given
today's high velocity industries and the decline in job security, the employer is
obligated to allow the employee the benefits of some of the confidential
information he is exposed to during his tenure. 2
These two competing trends in employees' rights63 raise many questions about
the legitimacy, justice and efficiency as premises for legal motivation, and will
serve as the doctrinal foundation for the case study of my proposed empirical
investigation.
The depiction of a pervasive norm for competition and against enforcement
of trade secrets should lead one to wonder whether the fact that these norms are
strong in the Valley has any effect on the perception of fairness, or willingness to
admit such a violation of the law by Silicon Valley employees. In other words, my
interest is whether the emerging social norms described in Hyde and Saxenian's
field studies effect people's individual perceptions of what is and is not just.
While law and economic scholars" favor this notion, because it supports their
conception of efficiency in norm development, the full explanation for this
behavioral change is far from clear. Does the fact that free transfer of knowledge
s Alan Hyde, The Wealth of Shard Information: Sicon Valky's High-Vdoy Labor Market,
EndogenossEconomrkGmwth,andtheLawofTadeSecrts(Sept 1998), athttp://andromeda.rutgers.edu/
-hyde/.

Hyde argues that social norms abolish the enforcement of trade secrets in Silicon Valley.
The actual explanation of Silicon Valley's high-velocity labor market is the third
hypothesis. Although employees depart Silicon Valley firms daily for
competitors who will learn at least some information that the law calls a trade
secret, employers rarely sue these employees or their new employers, for at least

three reasons that can be documented. First, a few such highly-publicized suits
accomplished little for plaintiffs, as will be seen from reviewing the journalistic

coverage of these suits. Second, such suits imposed direct costs on these
plaintiffs in reputation, internal morale, and recruiting. This will be confirmed
from journalistic and interview accounts. Third, lawyers in the Valley who
represent firms and venture capitalists concluded from this experience until
recently that the working definition of trade secret in the Valley is narrower than

the formal legal definition.
Id at Part IV.c.
6' Katherine V.W. Stone, The New PsycboogicalContract Impliations of the Chaning Workplac for
Laborand Employusent Lam, 48 UCLA L REV. 519, 592-94 (2001).
62 Id

62 Trade secrets vs. copyrights allocations.
"This is basically the argument made by Gilson and Hyde. Given that everyone enjoys the
prosperity of the Valley-both employees and employers--this norm is Pareto efficient Everyone
is getting more, etc. In the following section, I will discuss the concept of efficiency-of-norms
developments in more detail.
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benefits everyone in the Silicon Valley s affect people's attitudes toward violations
of trade secrets? Moreover, is this shared belief a part of the new psychological
contract in high-velocity industry, as some try to argue?" Do these emerging
social and legal norms in favor of ownership-allocations enforcement and against
trade secrets enforcement affect people's natural sense of justice (i.e. not taking
what is not yours and taking what you created)? Further complicating the
question is the need to keep in mind that, ignoring the legal norm in Silicon
Valley, the basic distributive justice argument seems to go in the opposite
direction. That is, pre-assignment of property rights for employee inventions
seems to go against the basic labor theory of justice67 which, at face value,"
implies that one should own what she developed. However, abstaining from
sharing the trade secrets of one's previous employer seems to meld with the basic
distributive-justice principle-that one should not take and use the work of
others.
1. Research Question 1:69 Overall, Which Iegal Doctrineis Mor Likely to Be Obeyed
by Siicon Vally Employees? Following the above review of the differing normative
status of trade secrets and allocation of ownership rights in Silicon Valley, the
question arises: which legal doctrine will enjoy greater compliance and legitimacy
among high-tech employees?
On the one hand, the legal culture of strong enforcement of pre-assignment
contracts and weak enforcement of trade secret agreements might be reflected in
unwillingness to break the former but not the latter. On the other hand,
according to the labor theory of ownership and justice, it is more sensible to
assume that participants will tend to take with them what they developed and
leave with their previous employer what was theirs. Thus, they will be willing to
violate legal requirements, but not trade secrets laws.
az The 'New"Norms Scholarship. As mentioned in the introduction, there
has been a growing interest in the legal academia of late in social norms' effect on
legal compliance. Law and economics scholars take a major part in this new
"industry" and offer the most systematic treatment of the relationship between

65 SAXENIAN, supranote 20, at 111-31 (especially with regard to "learning from failure").

' Stone, Ddra note 61, at 592-93.

6
' JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, 18-30 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett
Publishing 1980) (1690).
" Hettinger, supra note 41, at 38-41 (discussing the intuitive appeal of the labor theory, i.e. "I
made it, hence it's mine"). Set a/so Merges, ujbranote 36 (discussing the personhood and distributive
justice theories, which seem to support the labor theory in the context of employee inventions).
" To organize the structure of the Article, I will assign numbers to each question and will
present the questions, the empirical results and the discussion at the end of the Article in accordance

with this order.

"0See Ellickson, supra note 2.
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social norms and legal compliance. Neoclassical economic literature7 has
discussed the role of norms for more than two decades, but its implementation
in legal theory is still in its infancy.
Of the many discussions that are of interest in the literature, I will focus on
one; which is of the greatest import to the psychology-economics relationship.
This line of research seeks to clarify whether the laws and social norms have an
exogenous or endogenous effect on people's legal behavior.
The traditional law and economics research regarding norms' effect on legal
behavior argues that the norm alters the social costs and that violators of the law
need to pay." If people perceive that the vast majority of those in their region
behave in a certain way, they infer that following the norm is less likely to be
costly and that behaving against the norms is more likely to be costly, 3 since it
would be easier and cheaper for society to punish the individual violating the
norm.

Thus, there is no change in the simple-price mechanism that economists use
to explain compliance with the law.74 The only improvement is in the willingness
of law and economics scholars to recognize that non-legal sanctions might
increase the price of anti-social legal behaviors and that people might be willing
to go to the trouble of sanctioning others when they think that their behavior is
against the norm. Thus, even if it is against their direct self-interest, people will
be willing to impose a sanction. Naturally, the willingness of people to sanction
others who violate the law will make the deterrence factor stronger and more
effective than would a situation in which enforcement is being conducted only by
the formal legal system. 6 In that context it is unclear where economists would
locate the concept of fairness, which, according to psychologists, is the primary
motivation for legal compliance" i.e. whether perceived fairness of the law is

7 S e.g. Hiroaki Hayakawa, Bomun dRationay,SodalandCmturalNorms,anditerdpndnc Via
Riference Grous, 43 J. ECON. BEH. & ORG. 1 (2000); Assar Lindbeck, Incentives and Soda/Norms in
HouseholdBehavior,87 AM. ECON. REV. 370 (1997).
72 The original model regarding formal deterrence is attributed to Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An EconomicAproach,76 J. POL ECON. 169 (1968). For a sociological perspective on
the relationship between formal and informal deterrence, iee Robert F. Meier & Weldon T.Johnson,
Deterrence as Social ControL The Legal and ExtraLalProduction of Conformity, 42 AM. Soc. REV. 292
(1977).
73Robert D. Cooter, Decentra:tedLawfor a Compkx Economy, 23 Sw. U. L REV. 443 (1994).
74 See Becker, supra note 72.
7s This idea is developed by Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,Devlopment, andRegrtaionof Norms,
96 MIcH. L REv. 338, 366 (1997) (the pursuit of "hero" status and feedback effect generally can

cause individuals to incur costs inflicting materialsanctions on norm violators).
Dan M. Kahan, SocialInfljece, SodalMeaning and Deternce, 83 VA. L REv. 349,354 (1997).
For the most comprehensive study of fairness as a motivating factor in legal compliance, see
TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (Yale ed., 1990).
76
"
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associated with people's willingness to sanction those who violate the law,7" for
example. 9 If the law's perceived fairness is related to that willingness to sanction
those in violation of the law, then the more fair the law is, the more likely people
are to obey that law even in the deterrence model." This means that people
might also be more likely to obey fair laws because they might think that others
would be more likely to sanction them if they were to violate those laws.8"
Though in the experimental section of the Article, I focus on the deterrence
model, it is important to see the deterrence model in the context of the other two
effects of social norms on the law-. expression and internalization.
The second model in the law and economics of social norms, expressive law,82
posits the notion that the law creates focal points for cooperation and that the law
is effective, not because it increases the price, but because it increases the
likelihood of cooperation. 3 This model is still exogenous in its nature and only
shifts the focus from negative reinforcement, social sanctions, to positive
reinforcement, cooperation. In many scenarios these two models are
interchangeable. For example, hiring an employee who violates a law, when this
is the norm, becomes 'increased cooperation' and not hiring him becomes market
8
sanctions. 4

The third, and most progressive, model in the economic analysis of social
norms examines the law's capacity to bring about an actual change in personal
preferences, an interna'zation of new social values."' According to this model, the

78See Richard H. Thaler, Anemaies: The U/timatw Gae,2J. OF ECON. PERSP. 195,196 (1988)

(the relationship between fairness and willingness to punish others, even when such punishment was
costly for the individual, was demonstrated in a game theory context). This study did not examine
the fairness of the law.
"' Thomas W. Dunfee, The Marknlau of Morafif: FirstStps TowardA Theog ofMoral Choice, 8
Bus. ETHics Q. 127 (1998).
e See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Uti* ofDesert, 91 Nw. U. L REV. 453 (1997).
1 SeeJaneMansbridge,Starti*g
WithNothiinECONOMICVALUES AND ORGANIZATIONS 15168 (Ben-Ner & Putterman eds., 1998) (discussing the fact that it is impossible to base social norms
enforcement only on self-interest and that considerations of justice are necessary to understand the
maintenance of norms).
2 For the traditional view of what expressive law means, see Wibren Van Der Burg, The
Expressive and Commumcatihw FunctionsofLaw, 20J. LAw & PHIL 31 (2001) (regarding signaling moral
standing of the state trough existing but not enforced laws).
See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expreisiw Fnnction f Law, 144 U. PA. L REv. 2021 (1996).
There have been a number of competing models in law and economics to the expressive
function of the law, for an elaboration, see YUVAL FELDMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE LAw (2002) (on file with author).
85Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trst, Trmtw0,,hiness, and the B&haioralFoundation; of
CorporateLaw, 149 U.PA. L REv. 1735 (2001) (discussing high regulation of duty of loyalty as a signal
of low trust). For a recent summary of the three possible effects on law by social norms (deterrence,
expression and internalization), see Robert D. Cooter, Thre Effects of SodalNormson Law, 79 OR. L
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effect of norms is no longer exogenous to the individual preference, affecting only
the costs of behaviors; instead, it changes the order of their preferences 6 and,

therefore, their willingness to pay for having engaged7 in behaviors that are
approved or disapproved of according to social norms.
2. Research Question 2: Relationships Between Perceived Norm, Perceived Fairness,
WilNnkgness to Punish and Intention to Oby the Law. While the above discussion has
raised a wealth of empirical questions that should be answered relative to the
interrelationship between the three models and the perceived-fairness of the law,
this study focuses only on the social deterrence model and, in particular, on two
questions:
First, what is the effect of the perceived norm of disobedience to the law both
on employees' intentions to obey the law, and on people's willingness to sanction
others who violate the law?
The easiest prediction, based on current research," is that the greater the
perceived number of people who obey the law, the more likely people will obey
the law. Moreover, following the social deterrence model discussed by Cooter, 9
I would also expect that the greater the perceived obedience to the law is, the
higher an individual's willingness to sanction violators of the law will be.'

REV. 1 (2000) (describing the three effects).
Elizabeth Anderson, Bownd Homo Economies: New Dvlopments in Theories of Soda Norms, 29
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 170 (2000).
'
It should be noted that the three models of social norms in law and economics--deterrence,
expression, and internalization-resemble the model that Kelman has presented regarding the three
models of social influence. Kelman discusses "comliance," which focuses on the fear of society's

reaction-the "ewl" perspective; "identificatiod' which focuses on the "rl?' of the individual in the
relationships; and "internaZatidon" which focuses on the change in"values." It seems to me that while
there are some shared features between identification and expressive law-both discuss societal
expectations. For example, identification is reported by Kelman to trigger emotions of guilt, which
economists usually associate with the internalization function of norms. See HERBERT C. KELMAN
&LEE HAMILTON, CRIMESOFOBEDIENCE 103-24 (1989). However, Grasmick and Bursik, in their

paper on social deterrence have used "&t',l to represent self-imposed sanctions and "embaffasment'
to represent socially-imposed sanctions. Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Consdence,
Sigmficant Others, and Rational Choic: Extendixg the Deteence Model 24 L.& Soc. REV. 837 (1990)
(emphasis added).
" Robert B. Cialdini et al.,
A Focu Theog of Norave Conduct: A TheoreticalRefinment and
Reevaluation oftbe
Rol, oNorms in Human Behaior,24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL
201 (1991).

" See Robert D. Cooter, DecntrakdLaw for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
A ucating the Now Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L REV. 1643, 1671 (1996) (stating that an increase in
the perceived proportion of enforcers of norms causes a decrease in the price of punishment, this

means that if people think that many people intheir region violate the law, the cost of imposing a
sanction on those people increases).
90Id
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Second, how does perceived fairness of the law relate to people's willingness
to obey the law and sanction those who violate it?
While, again, the relationship between fairness and intention to obey is
straightforward," I would predict that fairness of the law would also have an
effect on people's willingness to sanction others who violate it. 2
Another feature that seems to be missing in the current literature of social
norms is the assessment of when norms are likely to have the greatest influence
over behavior. The current theoretical shift in law and economics is the
recognition that, in one's decisionmaking, the perception of what others are doing
should be taken into account. Currently, however, law and economic scholars do
not offer any theoretical explanation to determine when norms matter more to
people and whether we can identify ex-ante which situational factors will have a
greater effect on people's behavior.93 From a legal-policy-making perspective,
knowing ex-ante when norms are going to matter more is extremely important
since it might inform the legal policymaker as to the strategy most likely to effect
a desirable change in the behavior of other people. Turning to psychology's
literature on social norms will provide a wealth of competing and overlapping
theories that might puzzle a person seeking to apply these theories to a legal
context.9 ' There are many relevant theories that could be taken into account but,
to consider a few, I will mention Latane's theory of social impact," the debate
regarding moral development and social learning 96 the theory of social proof,
Tetlock's theory of accountability,9" the relationship between injunctive and
descriptive norms," and the theory of just world."

S TYLER, spra note 77.
See
See Steven Shavell & Michell A. Polinsky, The FairnessofSanaions: Some ImpicaionsforOptimal
S2
Enforment Poh, 2 AM. L & ECON. REV. 223 (2000). See also Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A

Theory of Fairness,Competition, and Cooperation, 114 Q. J. ECON. 817 (1999) (discussing fairness as a
motivating force for costly social sanctioning).
9' See, e.., Madan M. Pilluta & Xiao-Ping Chen, SodalNorms and Coopeationin SodalDilmma:
The Effect of Contea and Feedack, 78 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION
PROCESSES 81 (1999).
" See, e.g., Rachlinski, nepra note 3 (explaining past research and various theories).

9s Bibb Latane, The Pycholgy ofSoda/Impact, 36 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 343-56 (1981).
"' See ELLEN S. COHN & SUSAN 0. WHITE, Compaung Theories of LealSoaakation, in LEGAL
SOCIALIZATION, A STUDY OF NORMS AND RULES 27-50 (1990).
' Jeffrey Pfeffer et al., The Effect of Uncatainpfon the Use ofSodillnflnce in OranizationalDedion
Making, 21 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 227 (1976).
98 PHILIPE.TIOCK&JERALDS. LERNERAcwantahio'andSodalCogrdiion,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR, Vol. 1, 1-10 (1994).
99 See Cialdini et al., spra note 88.
100 See Adrian Furnham,JurtVorld Beif in an UqjwstSodepf: A Cross Ch4alComparison,15 EUR.
J. SOC. PSYCHOL 363-66 (1985) (demonstrating that in a society marked by discriminatory norms
(South Africa) people will be rated higher in their just world scale than in U.K.).
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In view of social psychology's many competing views on social norms, I wish
to discuss a unifying theory for the purpose of organizing our understanding of
the contingencies to be accounted for in 0t the prediction of norms' effects on
behavior: the theory of planned behavior. o
This paradigm, °2 though it might seem trivial at first glance, provides a useful
mechanism for explaining the relations between norms, beliefs, attitudes,
intentions and behaviors."°3 While economists have recently tried to define the
effect of norms on their models abstractly, the use of this paradigm could lead us
to a greater understanding of the situational factors moderating the effect of
norms on legal behavior. This paradigm, could and should be taken into account
to better understand the mix of normative control of behavior'04 and attitudinal
control of behavior."° Without taking this contingency into account, the
predicted relationship between norms and behavior will be limited and
inaccurate.Y Any legal-policymaker 7 interested in influencing people and
wishing to take into account the role of social norms needs to know when norms
are more likely to have an effect and when attitudes are more likely to have an
effect on people's behavior.'0 8

101 Icek Ajsen, The Theory of PlannedBehazor, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION

PROCESSES 179 (1991).
102 The original version of the theory of planned behavior was introduced as the theory of
reasoned action. See MARTIN FISHBEIN & ICEK AJzEN, BELIEF, ATTITUDE, INTENTION AND
BEHAVIOR: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND RESEARCH (1975).
103 Matt Hill et al., The Effects ofAltitue, Subective Norm and Se(-efticaq on Intention To BenchmarkA Camparison Between Managers wih Expenence and No Expeienc in Benchmarking, 17 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 313 (1996).
104Antony S.R. Manstead, The Rok ofMoralNorm in the Attitude-BehatiorRtelation,in ATTITUDES,
BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT. THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP 11-31
(Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg eds., 2000).
I's David Trafirnow, A Theory ofAtitudes, Subjectve Norms and Private Versus Collective Seef-concepts,
in ATmiTuDES, BEHAVIOR, AND SOCIAL CONTEXT, THE ROLE OF NORMS AND GROUP
MEMBERSHIP 47-66 (Deborah J. Terry & Michael A. Hogg eds., 2000).
'06 Martin Fishbein & Icek Ajzen, On Contruct VaRiiy: A Critique of Miniardand Cohen's Paper,
17 J. EXPERiMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL 340 (1980) (arguing that, while attitudes and norms are
obviously correlated, there is a theoretical reason to consider these two factors as separate, given that
they represent theoretically distinctive constructs). For recent evidence of the importance of
separating attitudes and norms in policy-oriented research, seeJames D. Gill et al., EcoloAgicalConcern,
Atttudes, andSodal Norms in Voing Behavior, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 537 (1986).
,o7 Or employer, in the narrow context of our case study.
i For survey-generated evidence of the limited effect of university policies on involvement of
university professors in business, see Karen Seashore Louis et al., Entrepreneurs in Academe: An
Exploration ofBehavionAmong Life Sdentists, 34 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 110 (1989). The authors show that
the attitudes of the professors toward such activity had a much stronger effect on intention than the
rules in each university.
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In the next section, I discuss the comparison of norms' effects on obedience
to contracts and to state laws and, in so doing, I argue that one of the reasons for
the predicted difference lies in the differing relationships of norms to attitudes
relative to contracts and state laws.
Given the limits of this Article, I focus on one example of a situational factor
that might moderate the effect of norms on behavior-social ambiguity.
Sherif's °9 research on social norms proved that, under conditions of uncertainty
and ambiguity, people are more likely to rely on the judgments of other people."'
According to this model of 'social proof,' we can assume that if the legal doctrine
is not clear to people, they will tend to focus more on other's judgments than on
their own. Similarly, Cialdini"' concludes that, "an individual is especially likely
to attend to and follow the lead of others when the environment is
uncertain... ."112
3. ResearchQuestion3: Does Uncertainty about the Law Moderatea Norm's Effea on
Peopk's Sef-reported Intention to Oby the Law? According to the social proof
paradigm, I would expect that employees who are less certain about the legal
meaning of trade secrets and of assignment of employee ownership rights will be
more likely to be influenced by the prevailing social norm than employees who
are more certain about the legal meanings of those laws.
In the introduction to this Article, I reviewed some of the lacunas of the
current law and economic treatment of social norms, one of which was that the
"law" is being treated as if there were one form of regulation, that functions
similarly to a normative effect.'
Furthermore, in the previous section, I argued
that one of the main shortcomings of the law and economics of social norms is
the lack of appreciation of questions crucial to any discussion of social norms in
the context of legal policy making-when would norms matter more, and when
would norms have a weaker effect on one's behavior?
Combining those two omissions led me to examine a very important policy
question: are social norms likely to have a similar effect on obedience in the
109

See Muzafer SherifAn ExperirmentalApproachto the StudJ ofAttitude , 1 SOCIOMETRY 90 (1937).

10

See David Dunning, SocialJudgment as Impidt Social Comparison, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
353, 369 (Suds & Wheeler eds., 2000) ("[lit is likely that

COMPARISON: THEORY AND RESEARCH

people are the most likely to engage in social comparison when they are the most uncertain about
themselves.").
"I See Robert B. Cialdini et al., Normative Infuences in OrganiZahions,in SHARED COGNmON IN
ORGANIZATIONS: THE MANAGEMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 195 (Leigh L Thompson et al. eds. 1999).
112 Id at 203-07 (specifically discussing the issue of dishonesty in organizations with attention to
the manner in which injunctive and descriptive norms spread). In the context of the spreading of
intellectual property norms in the Valley, one must look outside the organizational context.
113ButseeRichardH.McAdams,AnAtituinalTheog
.ofEprsiweLaw (New andCriticalAppmaches
to Law and Economics), 79 OR. L. REv. 339 (2000) (speculating that local authorities might be more
likely to change the attitudes of the local citizens than the federal government).
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contexts of state laws and employment contracts? Due to such factors as the
process through which contracts and regulations are being presented (individual
bargaining vs. state legislation) and the differing source of the obligation in
question (state vs. employer), a different emphasis in norms-attitude-behavior
relationships could be expected for an employee's obedience to contracts and to
state laws." 4 Knowing ex-ante which form of legal communication, contracts or
laws, is more likely to be influenced by perceived norms will provide extremely
important information for the legal policymaker. Thus, the importance of the
comparison of obedience to state laws versus obedience to employment contracts
seems to be important from a broader employment-policy perspective regarding
the best way to communicate to employees their legal obligations.
The need to compare the informal aspects of employment contracts and state
laws seems to be especially important in the context of intellectual property.
Much of the intellectual property distribution in the employment context relied
on the use of employment contracts through which employers wish to improve
their legal situation in case of a legal dispute regarding knowledge taken by the
departing employee."'
4. Research Question 4: Comparing the Normative Perceptions ofIP Requirementsfor
State Laws vs. Employment Contracts. What source of law will lead to higher
obedience, state regulation or employment contracts?
On one hand, greater compliance to contracts could be explained through
several theories in socialpsychology. For example, the procedural justice theory..
focuses, among other things, on the important roles that voice and control play
in perceived fairness. The theory is usually explored in the context of voice in
employment relations or the litigation courtroom, but the initial bargaining phase
of the contract could arguably trigger similar aspects of perceived voice and
control, especially with comparison to state laws, in which both the voice and
control of the individual are relatively limited." 7
Considerations of self-perception and cognitive dissonance also suggest that
the contracting process might increase people's willingness to perform the
contract. According to the self-perception theory," 8 if I signed the contract, I

.14
For a discussion of the relative weight given to norms versus attitudes in one's decision

making process, see Ajsen, spra note 101.
1s In the context of trade secrets, the standard contract is called a non-disclosure agreement; in
the context of ownership rights, the standard contract is called a pre-assignment agreement
116

See TOM R. TYLER ET. AL., SOCIALJUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOcIETY, 75-103 (1996) (reviewing

recent findings within this field). For additional taxonomy of organizational justice, see JERALD
GREENBERG, THE QUEST FORJUSTICE ON THEJOB 3-22 (1996).
" Even for the states in which the referendum system exists, both voice and control are limited
relative to a bargained contract.
uS Daryl J. Ber, Sef-Perceftio: An Alternative Interprtationof Cognitv Dissonana Phenomena,74
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probably thought the contract was good. Its "sister" theory, the cognitive
dissonance theory," 9 might lead to the same conclusion. According to this
theory, people will try to avoid situations in which their behavior and their
attitudes are inconsistent. The application of this theory to contracts might mean
that the personal commitment to accept the terms of the contract (change in
behavior) should lead people to accept its terms as appropriate."
I have suggested that the process and institutional mechanisms through which
laws and contracts are introduced to people might lead to a different attitudenorm balance, and that, given the voice and control people have over the
contract, contracts might seem more fair to people. However, the business reality
might complicate this argument. From a more realistic perspective, one could
expect that an employee would consider any distribution of intellectual property
originating from a contract as a sign of low fairness. The reasons for that could
be twofold. First, the company may need to use a contract because these rights
were originally the employee's. Such reasoning might suggest that the legislation
represents the status quo, while the contract represents a change in the legal status
against the employee.' 2' Second, from the few interviews that I have conducted,
it is evident that the variation of non-disclosure agreements and pre-assignment
contracts in the market is fairly low." Most employees whom I have interviewed
said that they were just given a handful of documents on their first day on the job
and that no meaningful bargaining had occurred. According to this more realistic
view, contracts should expect to have a lower level of perceived fairness than state
laws that, presumably, considered the interests of the employee in the framing of
the statute."'

a. Compliance to Which Source of Law isMore Sensitive to the Effect of Norms,
Employment ContractsorState Laws? One might expect that compliance to contracts
will be based more on attitudinal control, given the personal process of

PSYCHOL REV. 183, 184-85 (1967).
1'9LEON FEST1INGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
0 Obviously, if people do not read the contract they sign, there will be no real change in their
behavior.
121

See William S. Silver & Terence R. Mitchell, The Statm Quo Tending inDecdion Making, 18

ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 34 (1990).

122 Neumeyer studied nine large U.S. companies in the late 1960s (General Motors, US Steel,
IBM, Westinghouse, RCA, TRW, Gulf Oil, Polaroid, and Bell Laboratories) and discovered that all
required employees to assign all their inventions to the company using very similar documents.

FREDRIK NEUMEYER, THE EMPLOYED INVENTOR IN THE UNITED STATES: R&D POLICIES, LAW,
AND PRACICE 85-98 (1971).
'~

See Pauline T. Kim, Norws, LIarnin&andLaw: F_kyngthlIJ7jxanon eorkr'LegalKnowkde,

1999 U. ILL. L REV. 447 (1999) (providing key support for the view that employees systematically
overestimated the protection that employment law has given them). I am not aware of any counterstory regarding contracts.
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commitment that figured in the contract's bargaining process; while compliance
to state laws, which lacks the act of personal commitment, will be more sensitive
to the normative status of acceptability of the law than employment contracts.
It seems that knowledge that many of the people in a certain area are not obeying
a certain law might reduce the legitimacy and creditability of the law and. its.
enforcement. 4 However, the sense of personal commitment that is engaged in
the contracting process might mitigate the effect that norms would otherwise
have on individual behavior.
Moreover, even from the informative perspective on norms, others' behavior
is more relevant. This is due to the fact that, as opposed to law that is being
applied equally to all people, contracts differ from company to company and from
employee to employee, making the informational benefit from the following norm
(i.e. the behavior of people in other companies) lower in contracts.'" In other
words, while current discussion of social norms treats the concept of "law" as a
monolithic phenomenon, the approach taken in this article is that there are
theoretical, and, hence, policy reasons that justify a more modular approach to the
study of the social norm's effect on legal compliance.
V. METHOD

The main purpose of this study is to demonstrate the potential benefit that the

law and economics scholarship of social norms could gain from the use of social
psychological constructs and methodologies. Such approaches could improve
both the external validity of economic models of social norms by testing them in
real life contexts and the internal validity by transforming some of the vague
constructs of economic theory into measurable variables. The legal context that
was chosen for this purpose is Silicon Valley engineers' compliance to intellectual
property regulations and contracts. This context was chosen for two reasons.
First, it presents an interesting scenario, given the Valley's norm favoring the free
transfer of knowledge. This norm was described as efficient and well-accepted
by Silicon Valley engineers. Second, the lack of formal legal enforcement in this
area combined with the economic outcomes of non-compliance to the legal
doctrines make non-formal social controls a very important area, both from an

124 See PAUL H. ROBINSON &JOHN M. DARLEY,JUSTICE,LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY

VIEWS ANDTHECRIMINALLAw (1995) (arguing that closing the gap between community values and
legality would improve the legitimacy of the law).
"~ I am not arguing that a norm of disobedience to contract is irrelevant, only that it is less
relevant to one's decision to obey than with regard to state laws.
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employment 2 legal policy and from an intellectual property legal policy
perspectives.' 6
There are apparent limitations to the measurement of the actual behavior of
employees, and their contextual perception of the norm is limited due to the
difficulties in getting access to people in job transitions and the sensitivity of the
subject matter. Due to empirical limitations of measuring the effect of the "real"
norm on people's "actual" behavior, I have dictated an approach whereby people
were presented with hypothetical scenarios. I controlled for the normative status
(high/low disobedience), the doctrine (copyrights/trade secrets), and the source
of the legal requirement (state law/employment contract). This experimental
approach will enable me to speak about causality in relation to the effects of
norms on behavior with more confidence than that displayed in the usual survey
research (in which attributing the change in behavior to the social norm is
somewhat ambiguous)."z
VI. STUDY DESIGN
A. PARTICIPANTS

The study was conducted in Spring 2001. The participants in this study work
during the day in high-tech firms in the greater-Silicon-Valley area (San Francisco
included), either as engineers or as technical employees. Sixty percent of
participants were recruited from an evening MBA program at the Haas School of
Business, University of California, Berkeley. The participants filled out the
questionnaires during a break between their classes or were given a stamped
envelope in which to return the questionnaire. Response-rate was approximately
60%. Forty percent of the participants were recruited from Silicon Valley
companies (two large and two small). Response rate in this case was
approximately 35%."2
The final analysis of results was based on ninety participants.

'2 See William S. Laufer & Diana C. Robertson, CorporateEthics InitiaioeAs Soc alControl,16 J.
Bus. ETHICS 1029 (1997) (discussing the limits of formal controls in the context of changing the
ethics of employees).
'm See, e~g.,Ann E. Carlson, Rtychg Norms, 89 CAL. L Rev. 1231 (2001) (providing study
research). See a/s0 Ryan Goodman, Bgnd the Enforcement Pincip/k: Sodotm Laws, SocialNorms, and
Sedal Panoptia, 89 CALL REV. 643 (2001) (providing an example of qualitative research on the
relationship between norms and laws).
2 It should be noted that this sample is not argued to be a representative sample of Silicon Valley
employees.
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B. PROCEDURE

Each participant was presented with two hypothetical scenarios, one regarding
allocation of copyrights1" and one regarding the divulging of trade secrets. Half

of the participants got the trade secrets scenarios first, and half of the participants
got the copyrights scenarios first. The two scenarios were equivalent for all
participants except for two factors:
First, half of the participants were told that the source of the legal obligation
(trade secrets/allocation of copyrights of invention) was an employment contract
that they had signed, and the other half was told that the source was California
state law. Second, the other half of the participants were primed to think that
they were employed in a region in which the majority of employees complied with
the law/contract, and half were told that the majority of the employees in this
region did not comply with the law/contract The assignment to the four
conditions of the study was completely random.
Following each of the two scenarios, each participant was required to answer
questions (Likert Scales 1-5) with reference to the specific scenario that was
presented to them. The following questions were asked:
1. Each participant was asked whether he would have obeyed the
statute/contract if he had faced circumstances similar to those in the described
scenario.
2. Subjects were asked whether they think the statue/contract is fair.
3. Subjects were asked whether they would have hired someone who, they
know for certain, had violated the relevant statute/contract in the past.
These factors will be the dependent variables in the statistical analysis.
4. In addition, each participant was asked about her own employment history,
loyalty to the company, knowledge about the law and the contract, her
involvement in framing her employment contract, and her view regarding the
relative fairness of the law and the employment contract relative to laws in other
states and employment contracts of other employees.
At the end of the questionnaire, the participants were subject to a short
manipulation check to ensure that they had understood the discriminating
30
variables in the scenarios.'

'" As mentioned, the allocation of ownership rights shares a very similar perspective with regard
to copyrights and patents. Because the subject matter was software, the allocation of ownership
rights in employee invention was focused on allocation of copyrights for software created by the

employee.
'30

See exact text in the Appendix, infra pp. 97-104.
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C. VARIABLES, INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, SOCIAL NORMS' 3'

1. Social Norms of High Compance. Primed by: "previous survey in Silicon
Creek showed that the majority of the people in Silicon Creek never broke in their
professional career (the law/their employment contract).' ' 2
2. Social Norms of Low Compliance. Primed by: "previous survey in Silicon
Creek showed that the majority of the people in Silicon Creek admitted that they
have broken (the law/the contract) at least one time in their professional
33
career."'

3. Source ofLaw (Contract!Statute)and LegalDoctrine (Trade-secrtr/Assgnmentof
Copyights).
4. Trade Secrets. The source of law and the doctrine were presented via one
1
of the following four options: 3
1. "You have signed a contract in which you promised not to
disclose the trade secrets of your previous employer when you
move to a new job."
2. "The law in California is that you are not allowed to disclose
trade secrets when you move to a new job." (Hereinafter: trade
secrets.)
3. "You have signed a contract in which you promised to assign to
your current employer, 'the copyrights of any idea that will be
developed by you with the use of the time, materials or facilities
of the company."' (e.g. computer code)
4. "The law in California is that the copyrights of any idea that will
be developed by you with the use of the time, materials or
facilities of the company belong to the company." (Here and
after: copyrights allocations.)
5. Loyahy to the Company. Loyalty to the company was measured through
questions regarding the employee's intention to leave the company in the near
future, the perceived importance of the success of the company, and by the level
of salary gain that would prompt them to leave the company.

"' Some economists tend to use the notion of norms interchangeably to conceptualize both what
most others would do and what most others would approve. Social psychologists refer to the first
definition as descriptive norms and to the second definition as injunctive norms. See Cialdini et al.,
upra note 88 (describing the differences in effect of injunctive and descriptive norms). For the
purposes of this study I have used the concept of descriptive norms.
232 See Appendix, infra at 97.
'3

Id

'34

Id at 97-104.
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6. Position Charactritics.Position characteristics were defined.by tenure, job
title and whether the participant has major authority over other employees.
7. ContractingProcess. People were asked to report on whether they are familiar
with their explicit legal contract; they were also asked whether they had any effect
on the framing of that contract generally, and on the intellectual property section
in particular.
8. Social Comparison. Subjects were asked whether they think that the statute
in California is better (from the perspective of employees) than statutes in other
states, and whether their employment contract in general and the IP part of their

contract in particular is better than average.
9. LgalAmbiguity. Legal ambiguity was defined by asking the participants
about their certainty regarding the meaning of trade secrets and copyrights, and
about their familiarity with their own contract and the laws of California.
VII. RESULTS 35

The first research question focused on the comparative compliance to
copyrights allocations and to trade secrets. I have argued that there seem to be

two competing normative forces in effect. On the one hand, the first proposition
suggested that the legal culture of strong enforcement ofpre-assignment contracts
and weak enforcement of trade secret agreements will be reflected in an

unwillingness to break the former but not the latter. On the other hand, the
second proposition projected that the distributive-justice principle of taking what
one developed and leaving with one's previous employer what is hers will be
reflected in one's willingness to break copyright allocations requirements but not
trade secrets laws.
The findings from my study support the latter proposition, as can be seen in
the comparison of the following two figures:

In order for this Article to be accessible to as many people as possible all of the statistical
terminology was put into the Appendix, isfra pp. 97-104
1
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PARTICIPANTiS' VIEWS ABOUT VIOLATING TRADE SECRETS
WILL VIOLATE= 1; WILL NOT VIOLATE=5
5.00
2.00
3.00

4.00

PARTICIPANTS' VIEWS ABOUT VIOLATING COPYRIGHT ALLOCATIONS
WILL VIoLATE= 1; WILL NOT VIOLATE=5

1.00

5.00

2.00

4.00

w..

3.00
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The percentage of participants who reported that they would violate the law
of trade secrets and copyrights allocations are as follows:
Eighty percent of the participants answered either 4 or 5 on a scale of 1-5
(where 5 is very unlikely to obey the law), 77% of the subjects answered between
4-5 regarding the perceived fairness of trade secrets requirements, and 68%
claimed that they would not hire someone who violated trade secrets (4-5). Thus,
the vast majority of the employees reported that they were likely to comply with
trade secrets requirements.
With regard to copyrights for employee invention that were allocated to the
employees, only 41% answered 4-5 regarding intention to obey, 44% regarding
fairness of copyrights requirements (4-5), and only 32% claimed they would not
hire someone who would violate the copyrights which were assigned to their
previous employer (4-5).
A. TRADE SECRETS VS. COPYRIGHTS ALLOCATIONS

To examine the possibility that employees were significantly more likely to
respect trade secrets than copyrights, I have compared the means of the responses
for the two scenarios.
The differences between the means are presented in Table 1A;136 the t-values
for the differences between the means are presented in Table lB. 7 To
summarize these tables, we could conclude the following for the relationship
between trade secrets and copyrights: trade secrets were significantly and
consistently more respected than ownership allocations in all measured normative
dimensions, whether the source of the requirement was state law or the
employment contract.
B. LEGAL AMBIGUITY

Our second research question was whether legal ambiguity moderates the
effect of the norm on people's self-reported intention to obey the law.
We hypothesized that people who are less certain about the legal meaning of
trade secrets and of copyright law will be more likely to be influenced by the
prevailing social norm than people who are more certain about the legal meanings
of those laws (research question 2).
A moderation analysis was conducted by creating a centered multiple product
interaction term for uncertainty and effect of the norm. In a multiple regression
analysis, the interaction factor had no significant effect on employees' intention

'm Table 1A, infm at p. 106.
'37 Table 1B, infra at p. 106.
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to obey. Thus, I was not able to prove that uncertainty moderated the effect of
norms on employees' intentions to obey the law.
C. THE ROLE OF FAIRNESS

Research Question 3 focused on the relationship between fairness and
intention to obey, and willingness to sanction others who violate the legal
requirement. The relationships are presented in Table 2." To summarize the
findings presented in Table 2, in the ownership allocation scenario (copyrights):
Perceived fairness of copyrights allocations was strongly related to intention to
obey copyrights and willingness to punish those who violate the law. In the
divulging-of-trade-secrets scenario, perceived fairness of trade secrecy
requirements was significantly related to intention to obey trade secrets but not
significantly related to willingness to punish those who violate trade secrets
requirements."
Interestingly enough there was no relationship between people's intention to
obey ownership (copyright) allocation requirements and their intention to obey
trade secrets, while there was a strong relationship between their willingness to
sanction others who violate copyrights allocations or those who violate trade
secrets requirements. Thus, those who are likely to obey trade secrets laws are not
more likely to obey copyrights allocations, however those who are likely to
sanction others who violate trade secrets are more likely to sanction others with
regard to copyrights allocation.
Note: Due to the fact that I have found that the effect of norms on law is
contingent on the source of the legal requirement (state regulation/employment
contract), I will present the results regarding the effect of norms in the next
section. 40
D. OBEDIENCE TO EMPLOYMENTCONTRACTS VS. OBEDIENCE TO STATE LAWS

Research Question 4 was focused on comparing the normative status of IP
requirements that come from the state and from the employer and whether
norms had a different effect on contracts and laws. Table 3 presents the means
divided according to the source of law. 14' As is evident in Table 3, while there
was no difference between people's willingness to obey the trade secrets
requirements when they came from the state or from the employer, there was

...Table 2, inxfa p. 107.
'o

Was approaching significance, P=0.066
SeeJames Jaccard et al., INTERACnON EFFEcrs IN MULTIPLE REGRESSION 34 (1990).

'4'

Table 3, infra p. 108.

"
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such a difference with regard to copyright allocations. It seems that participants
were more likely to obey copyrights allocations when the requirement came from
the state than when the requirement came from the employer. The question of
whether this difference was significant will be explored by the next procedure.
E. ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

To determine the effect of the source of the legal requirement (law/contract),
the type of legal requirement (trade secrets/copyrights), and the social norm
(most people obey the law/disobey the law) on participants' intention to obey the
legal requirement and sanction others who disobey the legal requirements, I have
conducted an Analysis of Variance (Manova) procedure. The results are
presented in Table 4.1"2

As can be seen from Table 4 with regard to copyright allocation, employees
were significantly more likely to obey the requirement when it was presented as
having come from the state than when it was presented as having come from the
employment contract. However, there was no such difference with regard to
trade secrets. That is, the likelihood that the employee would obey trade secrets
laws when the requirements were shown to come from the state versus the
employment contract was almost the same.
F. EFFECTOFNORMSON OBEDIENCETO STATE LAWS VS. EFFECTOFNORMSON
OBEDIENCE 10 EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS

As can be seen from Table 4, social norms had no significant effect on
people's intention to obey, however there was an interaction effect between social
norm and the legal source."u This means that the effect of social norms on legal
behavior is contingent upon the source of the legal requirement.
To determine that source, I have tested the norm separately for the
participants who were told that the legal requirement was from their employment
contracts and for those who were told that the legal requirement came from the
state (T-Test for independent samples).
First I conducted the study presenting the legal source as the state. The
results are presented in Table 5.' " As can be seen from Tables 4 and 5, when the
source of the legal requirement came from the state law, social norms affected
employees' intended compliance for both types of law (trade secrets and

142Table

4, infra at p. 109.

1' The interaction was significant with regard to copyrights but was only approaching
significance with regard to trade secrets P=0.054
'" Table 5, infraatp. 110.
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copyrights allocations). Participants who were told that most people in their
region violate the laws of California (trade secrets and copyrights allocations)
were less likely to violate the law than participants who were told that most
people in their region do comply with California's legal requirements.
However, norms were not found to have a significant effect on people's
intention to sanction others14 ' (although it was approaching significance with
regard to copyrights). Thus I was unable to show that peoples' decision to
sanction others is contingent upon the perceived number of people who violated
the law."
Next, I conducted the same test with participants who were told that the IPrelated legal requirement came from their employment contract. Results are
presented in Table 6. t 4 7 As can be seen from the table, there was no significant
effect of social norms on people's intention to obey the legal requirement when
the source of the legal requirement was their employment contract.
VIII. DISCUSSION
A. COPYRIGHIS VS. TRADE SECRETS
As described in the introduction, scholars such as Gilson, Hyde and Saxenian,
have argued that it is a norm in Silicon Valley for people to share trade secrets
with other companies in the course of their career. In the present study, after
having been confronted with the legal definition of trade secrets, the vast majority
of the participants (80%) reported that they are not likely to disclose trade secrets.
Thus, people were relatively likely to keep'" trade secrets, even in the Silicon
Valley, a culture in which information sharing is perceived as innovative. 49
Nonetheless, it could be the case that in reality people unknowingly use trade

secrets.'5"
145 Understandably there was no effect on fairness, since a change in people's views of what is
fair cannot occur within the present design (presumably, to test the effect of norms on fairness one
must do a long-term study).
" Obviously, from a statistical perspective this does not mean that the perceived proportion of
people who engage in an activity has no effect on people's willingness to sanction others, it could
simply be due to the limitations of the manipulation.
147

Table 6, infra at p. 111.

Or at least report that they intend to keep trade secrets.
"9 Ste Gilson, tranote 14, at 585-86 (noting that knowledge spillovers supercharge innovation
and facilitate new technological development).
14 Stone, nom note 61, at 593 states it even more explicitly:
As courts expand the types of information they call trade secrets, it becomes
increasingly difficult for an employee to avoid learning them. Even an employee
who does not want exposure to trade secrets has no way to know which
148
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With regard to the allocation of copyrights, only 41% were likely to assign
ownership rights to their employer. As suggested, this fact could be explained
according to the basic labor theory' in which, even if legally one is told that
according to the law she is not the owner, she might still feel that she owns a
given product because she developed it.'
As shown in the results section, there was a significant difference in the means
of peoples' perceptions of fairness, intentions to obey, and intentions to sanction
others who violate the law. Thus, while in many cases these two doctrines seem
to regulate comparable behaviors, the employees who participate in my study
seem to treat those two doctrines as substantially different. Moreover, it was
shown that there was no relationship between those who would obey trade
secrets and those who would obey copyright laws. Intuitively, one would expect
that the same type of employees lacking respect for the law as well as their
employer's regulations would be more likely to divulge trade secrets and to "take"
ownership rights with them. This study, however, suggests that the reverse is
true. Thus, there is no general tendency to respect the intellectual property laws
in the workplace. This fact is especially interesting given that there is a strong
relationship between their willingness to sanction violators of trade secrets and
violators of copyright assignments.
Several factors could explain the discrepancies between the results of this
survey and the account of Silicon Valley relayed by Hyde and Saxenian. First, this
sample is not a strictly random sample of Silicon Valley employees. Sixty percent
of the participants are employees who decided to go to an MBA evening
program, which might define them as a unique group.'53 Second, I did not
distinguish the Silicon Valley from other parts of the Bay Area. It is possible that

San Francisco companies take part in a different culture."ts Third, people might,
on the one hand, prefer not to disclose their violations of trade secrets in a
survey. On the other hand, they may feel less shame in disclosing that they would
take their inventions with them, since it presents them as being creative and

information that he learns on a job might later be the subject of a successful
claim of protected trade secret status. When such an employee changes jobs, he
is at risk of a suit for misappropriation.
s See LOCKE, supra note 67.
152 See Floyd W. Rudmin, To Own is to be Perreivedto Own: A SoaalCognitie Look at the Ownership

ofPrp"etl, 6J. Soc. BEHAv. & PERSONALITY 85 (1991).

For example, employees who want to be managers (and therefore choose to go to an evening
MBA program) might have more respect for trade secrets requirements than employees who do not
Though it should be taken into account that having major responsibilities for other people had no
effect on viewpoints regarding trade secrets and copyright allocations.
"s'However, as mentioned in the introduction, Professor Saxnenian, who wrote the book on
Silicon Valley, found the culture in those two cities to be very similar.
153
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innovative-attributes less likely to be applied with regard to trade secrets
violations. Fourth, people might violate trade secrets without knowing that they
actually violate the law in doing so. In reality, the distinctions between secrets
and general, acquired knowledge are somewhat vague.'
This study was
obviously more artificial, as I asked people explicitly if they would violate trade
secrets, thus triggering a level of legal consciousness that probably does not exist
in most situations in which employees share trade secrets. Ownership rights to
inventions are easier to identify. Thus, the reported difference in peoples'
intentions to follow the legal requirements of those two doctrines might not be
reflected in real life. Nonetheless, the potential importance of this study with
regard to the findings of Saxenian, Gilson, and Hyde is that, when confronted

with the legal meaning of know-how sharing, the vast majority of the participants
found it inappropriate to do so. Future research should try to isolate whether
Silicon Valley employees are, in fact, aware of the illegality of their actions and
whether legal consciousness would have changed their decision to violate the law.
B. LEGAL AMBIGUITY

While certainty about the law was positively associated with its perceived
fairness, certainty did not moderate the effect of social norms on intention to
obey. According to the theory of social proof, people tend to rely on norms
more when circumstances are ambiguous."s In this study, we hypothesized that
legal knowledge could pose the concept of social ambiguity. Such an effect was
not present in this study. Two factors could explain this. First, due to the minor
effect of social norms in general, it is hard for a moderation effect to become
significant. Second, in the context of the study, people were not in doubt with
regard to the meanings of trade secrets or copyrights allocations mean, as the
terms were defined at the outset. To better explore the effect of ambiguity, it
might be necessary to repeat the study without giving legal definitions to the
participants."' 1 Nevertheless, the line of research regarding legal ambiguity seems
to be an important factor to consider for a policymaker interested in the effects
of social norms on people's legal obedience. Moreover, future research should

155

Set Stone, smpra note 61 (arguing that trade secret protection prevents an employee from

disclosing knowledge that qualifies as a "trade secret"-a vague and uncertain standard at best).
's6See SUSHIL BIKHCHANDAN ET AL, INFORMATIONAL CASCADES AND RATIONAL HERDING:

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (UCLA, Anderson, Ohio State Univ., and Yale, Working Paper,
1996).
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In fact, in a later unpublished experiment the author has demonstrated that legal ambiguity

could sever as a moderator when participants were not given information on the illegality of the
described behavior.
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not rely only on people's self-reported knowledge about the law,' 58 but instead
should try to quiz their actual knowledge regarding the specific doctrine in
question.
C.

CONTRACTS VS. REGULATIONS

In my view, the most interesting and important finding in this study was the
normative differences between state laws and employment contracts. The first
finding was that people were less likely to obey their employment contract
(compared to state laws) with regard to copyrights but not with regard to trade
secrets. The second and even more important finding was that norms affected
people's reported intention to obey the law but not their employment contract.
With regard to the first finding, the fact that the difference between the law
and the contract was true only with regard to the copyrights allocations (and not
trade secrets) seems to work well both in theory and in practice. From a practical
point of view, most non-disclosure agreements do not worsen the position of the
employee with regard to state requirements. With regard to invention
reallocations, however, the pre-assignment contract usually gives the employer
more rights than the state does. In the context of this study, there was no
difference between the requirements which were posed as originating in contract
versus state law. The participants, though, have considered copyright allocation
requirements as originating in their employment contract as an indication of
unfairness, in contrast to those participants who were told that the copyrights of
their inventions belong, by law, to their employer.
While building the theoretical foundation for these findings requires further
examination of people's views regarding their employer and the state, a
preliminary point seems to arise when comparing trade secrets and ownership
rights allocation. With regard to the employer's trade secrets, people had the
same respect for keeping the secret in confidence when the requirement was the
employer's as they did when it originated in state law. In this case the nature of
the requirement itself is based upon natural law and ethics. However, with regard
to assignment of ownership rights, people might be willing to accept the
ownership requirement when it comes from the state, as the state enjoys

1s8In my study, 60% of the participants said that they were either certain or very certain about
what "trade secrets" means. The percentage rose to 77% when the same question was asked for
"copyrights allocation."
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institutional legitimacy"s9 in determining who shall own what."6 People are more
reluctant to accept that an employer will assign the copyrights of an employee
invention to the employee, because the employer does not seem to enjoy that
same neutrality and legitimacy. 161 The employer's legitimacy is even further
jeopardized when she assigns the ownership rights to herself.
The second finding in the context of the law/contract division is that norms
effected people's intention to obey the law, but they had no effect on people's
intention to obey their employment contract. This finding poses a key issue for
the law and social norms literature to consider, as it offers a very important
contingency in the context of social norms' influence on legal behavior and has
practical implications for the policymaker. If the norms in a certain regime are
such that they appear to the legal policymaker to be welfare-enhancing, then
communicating a legal requirement through state laws will more likely be subject
to the effects of norms, and therefore will be more likely to be obeyed. However,
if the norms in a certain area are seen by the legal policymaker as welfaredestructing, as they are in the Silicon Valley area, then the contract is more likely
to be resilient to the effects of norms when used to communicate the legal
requirement.
From a theoretical standpoint, as with the previous finding about contracts,
further exploration should be conducted before attempting to trace the theory
behind this difference. However, as discussed in the introduction to these
research questions, there are two main reasons to expect norms to have a weaker
effect on employment contracts.
First, the contracting process is likely to create a personal commitment toward
the contract. According to social psychological studies, when an individual has
personally committed to a process, she is less likely to follow the behavior of
others with regard to her decision to obey the contract. Second, from an
informative perspective, following the crowd makes more sense with regard to
state laws than to employment contracts. State laws are, by definition, equal for
everyone. If one knows that others do not obey this law, one does not need to
invest more in order to know what exactly people do not obey. However, with

's The most vocal scholar in this context is John Locke. For an analysis of Locke's views about
the role of the state in the allocation of private property rights to individuals, seeJacqueline Stevens,

The Reasonabkness ofJohn Locke's Majorty: Property Rights, Consent, and Resistance in the Second Treatise, 24
POL. THEORY 423 (1996).
160 For a discussion of the influence of the allocation of property rights by the state, seeJohn L.
Campbell & Leon N. Lindberg, Property Rights and the Organization of EconomicActivi by the State, 55
AM. Soc. REv. 634 (1990). But see David Vogel, Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political
Consciousness of American CorporateExecutives, 8 BRiTISH J. POL Sci. 45 (1978).
161 For a comparison of the legitimacy of managers to that of the state, see Marian S. McNulty,
A Question of ManagerialLe41imagy, 18 ACAD. MGMTJ. 579 (1975).
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regard to employment contracts, which are by nature idiosyncratic, it would be
much harder for the individual to judge whether violators of employment
contracts had similar contracts to their own, just as it would be hard to determine
what sort of incentives were embedded in those contracts. Hence, it makes more
sense to follow the behavior of others with regard to laws than with regard to
employment contracts.
.It is also important to consider in this context the additional contract/law data
that was gathered. From the survey, it was determined that 56% of the people
were "very or somewhat familiar" with their contract but only 25% were familiar
with the law of California. Eighty percent of the subjects (of those who
knew-50% did not know) thought their contracts were average, while 85%
answered that they did not know whether the law of California was more fair than
the law in other states. Thus, it seems that, at least in terms of the information,
contracts are a much better means of transferring information to employees than
laws. This fact is very important for the law and economic discussions regarding
the expressive role that law plays in the context of changing social norms." 2 It
seems that, at least in terms of exposure to text, many more people know what
is written in their contract than know what is written in the law of their state.
Nonetheless, in terms of voice and control over the contract, only 28% of the
participants reported that their employer took their views about the contract
seriously or somewhat seriously. The percentage decreased to 23% when the
same questions were asked about the intellectual property section of their
employment contract.
IX. CONCLUSION

In this study I have tried to demonstrate the advantages of an experimental
approach and the importance of such an approach for the growing literature on
law and social norms. One of the main findings of this study is that norms'
effects on legal compliance are contingent on the source of the legal requirement.
If not for the experimental approach taken in this study, one would not be able
to isolate this effect from other factors that could explain this difference. One
obvious downside of this approach is the artificial setting of the study, since I am
not studying the actual behavior of people, but rather their reported intention to
violate trade secret or copyright allocations with regard to a hypothetical scenario.
From a more doctrinal perspective, key findings were also gleaned from the
comparative study of people's evaluations of copyrights versus their evaluations
of trade secrets violations. While the culture of Silicon Valley and the policy of

1 2 Robert Cooter, Normaive Fai/rrh

T/eogy ofLaw, 82 CORNELL L REV. 947 (1997).
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courts seem to be less ambivalent in the enforcement of pre-assignments of
inventions than they are in that of trade secrets, the participants' views about
those two doctrines seem to move in the other direction. The participants were
less likely to accept the legal requirements related to ownership allocations than
those associated with trade secrets disclosure. The difference between the two
doctrines was further pronounced by the fact that there was no relationship
whatsoever between them with regards to employees' willingness to comply.
Further research should be conducted in this vein to examine why exactly people
consider those two legal requirements to be distinct. A greater understanding is
especially important because, in many circumstances, the two doctrines could
regulate similar behavior, and disputes about ownership rights allocations for
inventions repeatedly trigger trade-secrecy arguments.6'
X. APPENDIX A-THE QUESTIONNAIRES
To avoid unnecessary repetition, I am presenting the eight types of

questionnaires in a shorter version. The order of the scenarios, as well as the
percentage used, was randomized in the actual questionnaires to avoid carryover
and order effects.
STATE LAW SCENARIO

Imagine the following scenario.
You are an employee of a hi-tech company in the Silicon Creek, CA.
The law in California is that an employee is not allowed to disclose trade
secrets of his current employer when she moves to a new company.
In the previous survey, which was conducted in the Silicon Creek, CA in 1999
(for social norms of b gb compliance), 81.6% of the subjects said that they had never
violated this law in their professional life.

(Forsocial norms of low comphance 81.6% of the subjects said that they have
violated the law at least one time in their professional career.)

You were offered a promotion in another company, and you decide to move
to that company.

,63As discussed earlier, sometimes, even if the employee has the right to the invention, the fact
that trade secrets of the employer were used in the production of the invention will prevent the
employee from taking advantage of the invention.
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What are the chances that you will obey this law in your new job (i.e.: that you
will respect the legal obligations toward your former employer required by this
law)? (Circle one)
I will most likely violate the law
I might violate the law
I am equally likely to obey or disobey the law
I think that I will not violate the law
I will most likely obey the law
How fair do you consider this kind of law? (Circle one)
Completely unfair
Somewhat unfair
Neither fair nor unfair
Somewhat fair
Completely fair
Now assume that you are an employer: how likely are you to hire someone
who has violated this law when she moved between two previous jobs? (Circle
one)
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor unlikely

Somewhat unlikely
Very unlikely
Now imagine the next scenario:
You are an employee of a Hi-tech company in the Silicon Creek, CA.
The law in California is that the copyrights of any idea that will be developed
by you with the use of the time, materials or facilities of the company belong to
the company (e.g.: copyright for a computer code).
(In the previous survey, which was conducted in the Silicon Creek in 1999,
82.1% of the subjects said that they had never violated this law in their
professional life.
(Forsocial norms of/ow comp'ancr. 82.1% of the subjects said that they have
violated the law at least one time in their professional career.)

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol10/iss1/4

40

Feldman: An Experimental Approach to the Study of Social Norms: The Alloca

20021

STUDY OF SOCIAL NORMS

You were offered a promotion in another company, and you decide to move
to that company. What are the chances that you will use an idea that was assigned
to your former employer by the law (and thus violate the legal requirement of
copyright laws) in your new job? (Circle one)
I will most likely violate the law
I might violate the law
I am equally likely to obey or disobey the law
I think that I will obey the law
I will most likely obey the law
How fair do you consider this kind of law? (Circle one)
Completely unfair
Somewhat unfair
Neither fair nor unfair
Somewhat fair
Completely fair
How likely are you to hire someone who has violated this law when she
moved between two previous jobs? (Circle one)
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor unlikely
Somewhat unlikely
Very unlikely
CONTRACT SCENARIO

Imagine the following scenario.
You are an employee of a Hi-tech company in the Silicon Creek, CA.
You have signed a "non-disclosure" contract with your current employer, in
which you promise not to disclose the company's trade secret, even if you move
to another company.
In the previous survey, which was conducted in the Silicon Creek in 1999,
81.6% of the subjects said that they had never breached a non-disclosure contract
in their professional life.
(Forsodal norms of/low compiance. 81.6% of the subjects said that they have
breached their non-disclosure contract at least one time in their professional
career.)
You were offered a promotion in another company, and you decide to move
to that company.
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What are the chances that you will share trade secrets (and, thus, breach your
contract with your former employer) in your new job? (Circle one)
I will most likely breach the contract
I might breach the contract
I am equally likely to breach or perform the contract
I think that I will perform the contract
I will most likely perform the contract

How fair do you consider this kind of non-disclosure agreement? (Circle one):
Completely unfair
Somewhat unfair
Neither fair nor unfair
Somewhat fair
Completely fair
Now assume that you are an employer. How likely are you to hire someone
who has breached a nondisclosure contract when she moved between two
previous jobs?
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor unlikely
Somewhat unlikely
Very unlikely
Now imagine a new scenario.
You are an employee of a Hi-Tech company in the Silicon Creek, CA.
You have signed a "pre-assignment" contract in which you promise to assign
to your current employer, "the copyrights of any idea that will be developed by
you with the use of the time, materials or facilities of the company" (e.g.,
copyright for a computer code).
In the previous survey, which was conducted in the Silicon Creek in 1999,
82.1% of the subjects said that they never breached this kind of contract in their
professional career.
(Forsocial norms of low comphanc. 82.1% of the subjects said that they have
breached this kind of contract at least one time in their professional career.)
You were offered a promotion in another company, and you decide to move
to that company.
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What are the chances that you will use an idea that you pre-assigned to your
former employer (and thus breach the contract with your former employer) in
your new job? (Circle one)
I will most likely breach the contract
I might breach the contract
I am equally likely to breach or perform the contract
I think that I will perform the contract
I will most likely perform the contract
How fair do you consider this kind of contract? (Circle one):
Completely unfair
Somewhat unfair
Neither fair nor unfair
Somewhat fair
Completely fair
Now assume that you are an employer. How likely are you to hire someone
who has violated this contract when she moved between two previous jobs?
(Circle one)
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor unlikely
Somewhat unlikely
Very unlikely
1.

How certain are you about the definition of "trade secret?"? (Circle one)
Very certain
Somewhat certain
Neither certain nor not certain
Somewhat not certain
Not certain at all

2.

How certain are you about the definition of "copyright?"? (Circle one)
Very certain
Somewhat certain
Neither certain nor not certain
Somewhat not certain
Not certain at all

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

43

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 4

J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 10:59

3. How familiar are you with the intellectual property laws in California?
(Circle one)
Very familiar
Somewhat familiar
Neither familiar nor not familiar
Somewhat not familiar
Not familiar at all
4. How familiar are you with the explicit intellectual property terms in your
employment contract? (Circle one)
Very familiar
Somewhat familiar
Neither familiar nor not familiar
Somewhat not familiar
Not familiar at all
5. Howwould you compare the intellectual propertylaws of California to those
of other states? (Circle one)
Much fairer
Somewhat Fairer
Average
Somewhat less fairer
Much less fairer
Don't know
6. How would you compare the intellectual property section of your contract
to what's available in the market? (Circle one)
Much fairer
Somewhat Fairer
Average
Somewhat less fairer
Much less fairer
Don't know
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7. Did your employer take your position regarding any of the terms of your
employment contract seriously in the time of negotiation the contract? (Circle
one)
Very seriously
Somewhat seriously
Neither seriously nor not seriously
Somewhat not seriously
Not seriously at all
8. Did your employer take your position regarding any of the terms in the
intellectual property section in the employment seriously? (Circle one)
Very seriously
Somewhat seriously
Neither seriously nor not seriously
Somewhat not seriously
Not seriously at all
9. What is your current position in the company? Junior engineer, senior
engineer, projects manager, marketing director, other?
10. Do you have primary responsibility as a supervisor or manager for other
employees? (Y/N)
11.

How many years have you worked for your current company?

12. How many employers employed you in the past 5 years?
13. How many employees are there in your company?
14. How likely you are to leave the company you are currently working for in the
coming year?
Very likely
Somewhat likely
Neither likely nor unlikely
Somewhat not likely
Not likely at all
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15. What raise in your salary will you need to decide to leave your current
company?
Less than 10%
10%+
30%+
50%+
70%+
16. How important is it for you that your company will succeed.
Very important
Somewhat important
Neither important nor not important
Somewhat not important
Not important at all
Without turning the page, try to answer the following 2 questions.
According to the 1999 survey, did the majority of Silicon Creek employees
(Circle one)
Obeyed the law
Obeyed the contract
Disobeyed the law
Disobeyed the contract
What legal doctrines were involved in the scenario presented to you in the
questionnaire?
Trade secrets in both
Copyrights in both
Trade secrets in one and copyrights in the other
XI. APPENDIX B-METHODOLOGICALLIMITATIONS
* Representation of the sample was limited. One could argue that
engineers who tend to go to business school might already adopt a
managerial mindset and therefore might not be a representative
sample. While the importance of representation is less critical with
regard to the experimental part of the study, the findings comparing
obedience to trade secrets and copyright allocation should be read
with caution.
* Sample size was relatively small-a fact that should be taken
into account especially considering that the statistical procedures
did not produce significant results.
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* Future research should also elaborate on position,
characteristics, job title, overall work experience, and whether the
employee was an executive. I have only asked about the primary
responsibility of other employees, and it did not seem to be a
distinctive factor.
* People's responses with regard to trade secrets were skewed and
not normally distributed. This fact complicated the assumption of
a linear relationship with regard to this dependent variable.
0 Social desirability--given the sensitivity of the subject matter, it
is possible that many people who intend to violate trade secrets, as
described in the Saxaneian and Hyde books, reported otherwise in
this survey. It is less clear why people would care more about social
desirability in an anonymous survey than they do in interviews.
0 Comparison with other regions-while priming the normative
acceptability of the contract and the law was supposed to substitute
for the empirical difficulties in measuring the effect of the norm,
the study of the actual norms in this study was fairly limited, given
that all of the participants come from the same place. Future
research should conduct the survey in a number of states. Such a
study will make it easier to test for internalization processes that
could not be thoroughly studied using the experimental set of this
study.
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TABLE 1A

TRADE-SECRETS VS. ALLOCATION OF COPYRIGHTS; MEANS COMPARISON (N=90)

Mean
violation of trade secrets
(violate=l; will not violate=S)
violation of copyrights
(will violate=l; will not violate=5)
fairness of trade secrets
(unfair=l; fair-5)
fairness of copyrights
(unfair= 1; fair= 5)
market sanctions for trade secrets
(will hire=1; will not hire=5)
market sanctions for copyrights
(will hire= 1; will not hire=)

TABLE

Std.
Error Mean

Std.
Deviation

4.0000

.9944

.1048

3.1333

1.1138

.1174

4.0333

1.0217

.1077

3.1222

1.1692

.1232

3.7556

1.1149

.1175

3.1333

1.1138

.1174

1B

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEANS OF TRADE SECRETS AND COPYRIGHTS-PAIRED SAMPLES
T-TEST (N=90)

Paired Differences
Mean

Std.
Deviation

t

df

Sig.
(2-tailed)

Std.
Error Mean

violation of trade secretviolation of copyrights

.8667

1.5080

.1590

5.452

89

.000

fairness of trade secretsfairness of copyrights

.9111

1.1770

.1241

7.344

89

.000

market sanctions for trade
secrets-market sanctions
for copyrights

.6222

1.1667

.1230

5.059

89

.000
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TABLE 4
EFFECT'S OF THE SOURCE OF LAW (LAW/CONTRACI) AND THE PREVAILING NORM
(HIGH COMPUANCE/LOW COMPUANCE) ON NORMATIVEJUDGMENTS REGARDING
TRADE SECRETS AND COPYRIGHT ALLOCATIONS

Source

Dependent Variable

F

df

Sig.

Social norms (high
compliance/low
compliance)

violation of trade secrets
violation of copyrights
market sanctions for trade secrets
market sanctions for copyrights
fairness of trade secrets
fairness of copyrights

1
1
1
1
1
1

1.217
.964
1.277
1.749
1.84
1.79

.273
.329
.262
.190
.669
.673

source of law
(employment
contract/state law)

violation of trade secrets
violation of copyrights
market sanctions for trade secrets
market sanctions for copyrights
fairness of trade secrets
fairness of copyrights

1
1
1
1
1
1

.003
4.470
3.249
1.238
.332
.864

.956
.037
.075
.269
.566
.355

social norms*
source of law
(interaction)

violation of trade secrets
violation of copyrights
market sanctions for trade secrets
market sanctions for copyrights
fairness of trade secrets
fairness of copyrights

1
1
1
1
1
1

3.812
7.070
.179
1.974
2.868
1.333

.054
.009
.673
.164
.094
.252
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TABLE

5

EFFECT OF NORMS ON INTENTION TO VIOLATE TRADE SECRETS AND COPYRIGHT ALLOCATTONS WHEN
SOURCE OF LAW IS STATE LAW

high complance=1
low compliance=0

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

violation of trade secrets

.00
1.00

22
22

3.6818
4.3182

1.0414
.7162

.2220
.1527

market sanctions for
trade secrets

.00
1.00

22
22

3.3636
3.7273

1.2168
1.0320

.2594
.2200

violation of copyrights

.00
1.00

22
22

29545
3.7727

1.0455
1.1519

.2229
.2456

market sanctions for
copyrights

.00
1.00

22
22

2.6818
3.3182

1.2105
1.0861

.2581
.2316

T-TEST (INDEPENDENT SAMPLES)

t-test for Equality of Means
t

df

Sig.
(2-tailed)

violation of trade secrets

-2.362

42

.023

market sanctions for trade secrets

-1.069

42

.291

violation of copyrights

-2.467

42

.018

market sanctions for copyrights

-1.835

42

.074
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EFFECT OF NORMS ON INTENTION TO VIOLATE TRADE SECRETS AND COPYRIGHT ALLOCATIONS WHEN

THE PRESENTED SOURCE OF LAW IS THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT

high compliance=1
low compliance=0

N

Mean

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

violation of trade secrets

.00
1.00

26
20

4.0769
3.9000

1.0926
1.0208

.2143
.2283

market sanctions for
trade secrets

.00
1.00

26
20

3.8846
4.0500

1.0325
1.1459

.2025
.2562

violation of copyrights

.00
1.00

26
20

3.0769
2.7000

1.0168
1.0311

.1994
.2306

market sanctions for
copyrights

.00
1.00

26
20

3.2692
3.2500

1.0023
1.1180

.1966
.2500

T-TEST (INDEPENDENT SAMPLES)

t-test for Equality of Means
t
violation of trade secrets

df

Sig. (2-tailed)

.560

44

.578

market sanctions for trade secrets

-.513

44

.610

violation of copyrights

1.239

44

.222

.061

44

.951

market sanctions for copyrights
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